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Re-reading the classical books on the liberalisa-
tion of authoritarian regimes and/or democra-
tisation is a useful exercise. One of the clearest 
findings of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s Prob-
lems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
is that Romania and Spain occupy the extremes 
of the transition spectrum, with the former as 
the basket case and the latter as the poster child 
of successful democratisation. This analysis is 
based on differences in the scope and quali-
ty of democratisation, conditioned by both elite 
leadership and a series of pre-existing varia-
bles such as the nature of the authoritarian re-
gime, the degree of mobilisation within civil so-
ciety, thresholds of economic development and 
the existence or lack of established opposition 
parties or groups.1 
This perspective shaped the golden age of transi-
tion studies during the 1990s. In this article we ar-
gue that in the light of new historical evidence and 
a more serious look at the political economy of 
these moments of systemic political change, this 
perspective needs updating. Indeed, we find that 
la transición was more contested and contentious 
than commonly understood by transitologists. 
The other claim made by this article is that tran-
sitology’s inattention to the political economy of 
transition obscures important insights. The first 
is that exogenous economic shocks can facil-
itate the extensive political transformation of 
an authoritarian regime. Certainly the econom-
ic destabilisation of the sociopolitical status quo 
does not determine such outcomes. Neverthe-
less, they can create unique opportunities for 
political action among regime insiders, opposi-
tional elites and mass movements. The second 
insight is that, given their contestable political 
legitimacy, postauthoritarian elites that benefit 
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from political liberalisation are likely to be cautious about adopting liberal economic reforms with-
out adopting measures that compensate the losers of liberalisation. Spain and Romania look very 
similar in this regard as well.
The focus on political economy adopted by this comparative analysis of two transition pathways is in-
spired by the trailblazing work of Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman2 and, with specific regard to 
the case of Spain, by the seminal insights of Robert Fishman.3 Our contribution to this literature is to 
highlight more than they do the role of international sovereign debt issues and the economic ideas of lo-
cal powerbrokers, two aspects that have not received much attention in this rich strand of scholarship. 
Specifically, we show that exogenous economic and geopolitical shocks (the 1970s oil crises in 
the case of Spain and the 1980s debt crisis in the case of Romania) unleashed new political dy-
namics in both authoritarian systems. For Spain’s Francoism, the destabilisation of the status quo 
was fuelled, first, by the death of Franco and, second, by the social and economic costs of the first 
oil shock. For Romanian Ceausism it was the combination of the regime’s economic ideology, the 
second oil shock and the debt crisis in much of the Global South, a crisis triggered by the spike in 
interest rates initiated by the US government. 
This article relies on new secondary literature, primary documents and interviews with major tran-
sition figures (in the case of Romania). The first section revisits Linz and Stepan’s transition spec-
trum while the second examines the effects of oil crises in Romania and Spain – compounded, in 
the former’s case, by a debt crisis – and their critical contribution to the end of authoritarianism in 
both countries. The third and fourth sections analyse the political economy of Romania’s (1989–
1996) and Spain’s (1975–1982) transitions to democracy. A final section draws implications of our 
findings for the study of transitions to democracy and the relationship between economic crises 
and political upheaval.
Revisiting the ends of Linz and Stepan’s transition spectrum
Today, both Romania and Spain have relatively presentable, albeit weak democracies, but the once 
dramatic differences between them seem to have faded quite a lot. Spain’s status as a textbook 
story of transition and consolidation is being shadowed by ongoing events and is being extensive-
ly challenged by many Spain scholars and Spanish political and civic actors. Political scientist Si-
mon Tormey spoke for many scholars when he dramatically labelled Spain a “zombie democracy”, 
stumbling around with little sense of legitimacy.4 Faced with the avalanche of uncomfortable facts 
smearing the reputation of Spain’s paradigmatic transition, one scholar talked about a transition 
that was “neither model, nor failure”,5 one euphemistically referred to “institutional degeneration”,6 
while another was harsher when he titled his article analysing this malaise thus: “Spain: Corruption, 
Weak Institutionalization, Unfinished Democratization.”7 Writing at the beginning of the crisis of the 
eurozone “periphery”, Fishman pointed a finger at Spain’s elitist transition model for the country’s 
persistent failures in the provision of employment and adequate financing for small firms and wel-
fare benefits relative to the poorer Portugal.8 
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Since the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, revelations of widespread political corruption in 
Spain, coupled with catastrophic levels of youth unemployment and the pain accompanying auster-
ity policies, have tarnished the image of the country’s establishment to the point that fundamental 
institutions have seen unprecedented levels of distrust among citizens.9 Opinion polls give Spain’s 
leading institutions – courts, parliament and parties – their lowest approval ratings in history.10 In 
lieu of the national unity spirit supposedly sealed during the transition, Madrid now faces a situa-
tion in which the northeastern region of Catalonia is taking active steps to secede from the rest of 
the country. Economic hardship, social unrest and gagging laws have led many to reconsider the 
supposedly ideal nature of Spanish democracy. 
Nothing furnishes proof of this dynamic better than the rise of Podemos, a radical democratic left 
party that came to lead in the Spanish polls less than a year after it was created, and promises to 
“break the lock” that the “1978 regime” imposes on Spanish democracy.11 While Spanish protest 
movements were “no longer different from their Western counterparts”,12 Podemos has tapped 
into both a source of current frustration towards Spain’s political establishment and a broader dis-
affection towards some of the key institutions of post-Franco democracy.
Things do not look brighter in Romania. Citizens tend to have more confidence in repressive state 
institutions (anticorruption prosecutors, the military) than in democratically elected bodies. Protest 
policing has certainly been harsh at times, but not as harsh as in Spain and no gagging laws have 
been adopted in Bucharest. In 2012, the opposition took power after undermining key democratic 
institutions such as the ombudsman and trampling over parliamentary procedures. 
Writing in 1996, Linz and Stepan were right to be sceptical of the course of democratisation in Ro-
mania, a country whose leaders travelled to Madrid in 1990 to take notes about how the Spanish 
did so well.13 Critically, while in Spain the authoritarian regime did not order the repressive appa-
ratus to open fire on protestors, Romania experienced shocking bloodshed. This lent credibility to 
Linz and Stepan’s argument that given Romania’s “fundamentally different place” even in the con-
text of communist Eastern Europe, where it had the “weakest organised opposition in the region”, 
it was “virtually impossible” for the country to transition to democracy without bloodshed.14 Indeed, 
even after the dictator died, in 1990–1991 the country’s transition was marred by social and ethnic 
conflicts, often abetted by the state, and public opinion polls showed less support for democracy 
six years after the end of the authoritarian regime than they did in Spain after the same period of 
time. Furthermore, the political forces steeped in the structures of the old regime lost the second 
free and fair elections in Spain, whereas they lost for the first time after the third elections during 
democracy in Romania. The most dramatic difference was the use of the coal miners by the Ro-
manian government as a quasi-police force that raided protest camps in central Bucharest, ter-
rorised the University of Bucharest’s classrooms, committed acts of violence against bearded and 
bespectacled pedestrians and wreaked havoc on the opposition’s offices. 
But if one digs deeper and casts a longer-term perspective when comparing Spain’s la transición 
with Romania’s tranzitie, the differences seem less striking today than in the mid-1990s, when Linz 
and Stepan finished their opus. In both countries the insiders of the old regime were the first win-
ners of liberalisation and gradually shed their connections with the past. Spain’s first democrat-








ically elected government was formed by the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), which was 
little more than a Francoist successor party. Despite the fact that the Romanian Communist Party 
(RCP) had been banned, most analyses of postcommunist parties define the Romanian National 
Salvation Front (FSN) as a communist successor party.15
In both countries, the defining marker of consolidation (the political opposition winning in the polls) 
took place exactly seven years after the death of the authoritarian ruler. Also, in both countries 
successive governments failed to deal with the horrific human rights abuses of the authoritarian 
regime. Ten years after the end of dictatorship in both countries, the judicial branch did not experi-
ence any significant turnover and the economic privileges of regime insiders survived. Moreover, 
in both Spain and Romania key pillars of the repression apparatuses built during the dictatorship 
managed to reproduce themselves to a relatively similar extent across the terms of several freely 
elected governments. 
In November 1975 it was far from obvious that Spain would become a parliamentary democracy. 
At the time no political faction, from fascist hardliners to the communist opposition, was strong 
enough to impose its agenda on all others. But as Josep María Colomer pointed out, the balance 
of power was tilted in favour of Francoist reformists and those opposition parties willing to nego-
tiate with them.16 Because the regime did not collapse following Franco’s death, the former held 
a more powerful position than the latter. As a result, Francoist reformers led the transition in its 
initial – and ultimately most relevant – stages.
It is common to refer to Spain’s political and economic transition as a “double transition”. Indeed, 
Spain’s political transition did not occur as a “velvet revolution” in which the outcomes of political 
liberalisation were shaped by elites alone. Organised workers were highly mobilised during its ear-
ly stages and played an instrumental role throughout the process, pressuring key actors to take 
into account their demands and considerations.
Granted, Spain did not experience the radical socialist mobilisation of Portuguese industrial work-
ers and peasants, whose intensity had not been matched in Europe for many decades.17 In Roma-
nia political violence orchestrated by the state security apparatus was much greater but it was very 
short-lived, effectively ending once the Ceausescu couple had been executed, with a brief flurry of 
localised, interethnic violence in 1990 remaining an isolated episode. Between 1976 and 1977, how-
ever, Spanish political life was anything but thoroughly peaceful or limited to political elites. As a 
matter of fact, the elite-engineered reforma pactada took place against the background of political 
violence, state repression, worker strikes and Basque and Catalan demands for self-government. 
In the dominant account of the transition to democracy, “consensus” is the keyword that symbolis-
es the spirit of collaboration between Francoist reformers and a relatively tame opposition. Partic-
ipants in the process, however, frequently remark that fear was the dominant feeling of the day.18 
Hagiographies on the subject notwithstanding, the Spanish transition was a violent process, with 
more than 600 Spaniards murdered for political reasons between Franco’s death 1975 and 1986.19 
The spiral of violence caused by ETA’s killings and the extreme right’s murders – most notably the 
Montejurra shootings in May 1976 and the murder of communist lawyers in Madrid in January 1977 
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– and harsh government reprisals conditioned the entire process. Wave after wave of assassina-
tions, kidnappings and police shootings ripped through the fabric of Spanish political life between 
the adoption of political reform laws that gave Spain a multiparty system, and the organisation of 
the first free and fair elections in 1977, with political killings rising steadily until 1980. 
Against this backdrop, the importance of memory and political learning became a critical feature 
of the Spanish transition. The collective memory of the 1936–1939 civil war haunted elites across 
the political spectrum as well as most of Spanish society.20 As Paloma Aguilar has noted in her 
landmark study, avoiding a similar bloodbath became an across-the-board imperative.21 Ultimate-
ly, the necessity for reconciliation led to a collective unwillingness to revisit the past – or rather, a 
willingness to forget it under a blanket of institutionalised amnesia. No purges of the Francoist es-
tablishment took place, and attempts to provide transitional justice went nowhere. When an am-
nesty law for political prisoners was finally approved in October 1977, it contained two unnoticed 
paragraphs shielding Francoist officials from “crimes and faults” committed during their mandate.22 
Strikingly, on some levels of the “transitological” debate, Romania does better than Spain. For all their 
ills, the founding elections in Romania were organised five months after the death of the dictator; in 
Spain, this took two years. It is also an overlooked fact that unlike in Romania, where higher-echelon 
regime insiders were effectively removed from the levers of power within days of the dictator’s death, 
Franco’s regime survived his death relatively unscathed. While Spain’s first democratic government 
faced a restive military and an attempted coup d’état in 1981, Romanian governments always had a 
firm grip on the military. Backed by the EU, in recent years an independent Romanian anticorruption 
body has jailed a record number of leading politicians, civil servants from all levels of the state bureau-
cracy and some of the country’s wealthiest businesspeople, making the country a model for antigraft 
campaigners. Spain’s extensive corruption has not experienced similar challenges yet. 
Finally, in the long term, popular arguments made by transitiologists that post-sultanist Romania 
would most likely fail to democratise and even slip into ethnic warfare proved to be overstated. If 
one looks at the state of democracy in Eastern Europe today, it is instead Hungary – once the post-
er child of Spanish-style pacted transition – that has the greatest struggles with liberal democracy. 
In lieu of ethnic war, by the early 2000s Romania had one of the most advanced formal systems 
of protection for ethnic minorities in Europe.23 Although at the informal level, Romanian–Hungar-
ian animosities endure due to “separate and opposite views of entitlement grounded in different 
interpretations of history”,24 observers agree that this country’s progress from violent conflict to 
interethnic peace and progressive minority rights is one of the most intriguing transformations of 
recent European history.25 
One caveat is important at this point. These findings are not meant to excessively downgrade the 
pacted transition model as it was built in Spain. Bonnie Field and Omar Encarnacion have produced 
convincing evidence that Spain’s Moncloa pacts did not preclude more competitive and represent-
ative democratic politics, as initially feared.26 Also, intraparty discipline had its dark side, but overall 
it probably spared Spain some dramatic political troubles.27 A recent volume edited by Diego Muro 
and Gregorio Alonso, which brings together leading names in the study of Spanish democratisa-
tion studies (Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, Ignacio Lago, Bonnie Field, Pablo Sánchez 








Leon), makes a compelling case for not giving up too easily on the virtues of Spain’s dramatic po-
litical transformation in the late 1970s.28 Our aim is only to contribute to the comparative literature 
on democratisation by qualifying the extreme contrasts posited by an iconic piece of this literature. 
Oil shocks and the end of Francoism in Spain
Spain, according to Linz and Stepan, as well as a cohort of transitologists following in their foot-
steps, constitutes “the paradigmatic case for the study of pacted transition and rapid democrat-
ic consolidation, much as the Weimar Republic became paradigmatic for the study of democratic 
breakdown”.29 A few years earlier, Gunther praised Spain as the ultimate model of transition by 
elite settlement.30 The country had ideal conditions on most variables relevant to the process – a 
“civilianised-authoritarian regime”, relatively strong opposition parties and a civil society that al-
ready mirrored Western Europe’s, in large measure as a result of the regime’s strong economic 
development throughout the 1960s.31 But the path from dictatorship to democracy was not set in 
stone. While it may have officially began with Franco’s death in November 1975, the transition was 
accelerated by exogenous economic shocks. 
However, compared to the severity of Romania’s debt crisis and draconian austerity of the 1980s, 
followed by international policy conditionality in the early 1990s, the final years of Francoism were 
spent in relative prosperity and the first transition governments maintained their policy autonomy. 
This gave the Spanish authorities more political options when dealing with the demands made by 
opposition parties and mobilised citizens.
Ironically, the end of Keynesianism, the great enabler of the golden age of embedded liberalism, 
coincided with the death of Franco. At the same time, the Spanish government was one of the few 
European governments that reacted to the October 1973 oil shock by refraining from adopting 
Keynesian policies, despite the fact that Spain had the highest savings and credit ratings in the Med-
iterranean. In Spain – the OECD’s most notorious oil-guzzler – the attempts made by the central 
bank and finance ministry to transfer the costs of adjustment to the population facilitated antire-
gime mobilisation across very different sectors of society once the OPEC price hike began to bite.32 
The terminal crisis of the Bretton Woods order and Europe’s entry into stagflation had immediate 
repercussions in Spain. As the markets bet aggressively against an overvalued dollar in 1969, they 
saw incentives in investing in the undervalued currencies of countries with strong growth and low 
debt like Spain. As a result, Spain saw a boost in credit, inflationary pressures and a deteriorating 
balance-of-payments sheet. Between 1971 and 1973, Spain’s hard currency reserves grew by 500 
percent, encouraging more speculation on the peseta. Declaring that the economy was “overheat-
ed”, the finance ministry intervened to “cool” the upward cycle by increasing the discount rate to the 
high levels used by France during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
But while Spain’s balance of payment figures (with the exception of the current account) saw im-
portant surpluses, the high interest rates attracted foreign portfolio investments, which facilitated 
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a spectacular inflation growth from 1.6 in 1970 to 8.3 percent in 1971. Before the first oil shock hit, 
Spain’s inflation was at 14 percent, almost double the average of the previous 15 years (7.8 per-
cent).33 But, like in postwar France, Spain’s high inflation was accompanied by high growth rates 
(almost 8 percent in 1973), full employment and high savings simultaneously.34 
The economic crisis and the emerging political crisis ignited important reconsiderations at the top 
of the regime. Unfortunately for the Spanish government, the oil shock of 1973 cost Spain 3 per-
cent of GDP,35 put its external deficit in the red for years to come and increased inflationary pres-
sures even further. The economic dislocations were so severe and the situation in post-Caetano 
Portugal so dramatic that Franco’s successors were initially concerned that the status quo would 
be radically challenged should they not open up the valves of discontent in controlled ways. After 
a decade of spectacular growth, the regime had a hard time maintaining its base while the crisis 
set in. Indeed, the Catholic church, under Cardinal Tarancón, had withdrawn its until then steadfast 
support.36 Internal pressure, coupled with the need to find a successor for the aging dictator, posed 
serious problems for the perpetuation of authoritarian rule.37 Yet the regime remained in a posi-
tion of strength, and the road to democracy was obstructed by an unresolved economic crisis, the 
absence of a clear opposition leader and a host of other thorny issues that needed to be tackled – 
most notably regional plights for autonomy and widespread violence triggered by ETA. 
The regime also faced a young generation of students who had been politicised by the Spanish 
1968. As Kostis Kornetis shows, like other Mediterranean countries Spain experienced a diffu-
sion of leftist cultural protest frames and had its youth primed for political contention as a result. 
Indeed, the country’s educated urban youth entered the transition years with a “long 60s” mindset 
shaped as much by the Western student movements as by the Latin American (and particularly 
Cuban) leftist experiences.38
Unlike in Romania, Spain’s dictator died peacefully in his own bed. This turned out to matter a lot 
more for Spain’s political transformation than the ongoing economic crisis. In this climate, mass 
mobilisation for democracy, coupled with and reinforced by economic discontent, pushed regime 
insiders towards political liberalisation. As in Romania, Spain witnessed a great deal of social un-
rest following the adoption of the first political liberalisation measures. The dismantlement of state 
planning following ETA’s assassination of Carrero Blanco, the planners’ patron, coupled with Fran-
co’s imminent death and growing social unrest increased economic uncertainty for investors ac-
customed to a stable authoritarian regime. At the same time, this climate strengthened the hand of 
reformists from the old regime and their critics in the political opposition who claimed that Spanish 
capitalism did not compensate the losers of the market economy as much as it should. Economic 
uncertainty was compounded by political uncertainty: with prime ministers and finance ministers 
changing every year between 1973 and 1977, nobody knew what kind of political regime would 
emerge. As a result, policymakers postponed potentially disruptive socioeconomic reforms, es-
pecially those that risked increases in unemployment or wage cuts. 
One of the great but underappreciated insights of Linz and Stepan’s volume is that the pivotal elites 
associated with the old regime (King Juan Carlos and post-Francoist premier Adolfo Suárez) act-
ed out of “fear of a vacuum of authority, of a sudden transfer to the then quite radical opposition 








forces”.39 The insiders, however, would find their position strengthened by the opposition’s tactical 
mistakes. Its two main parties, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the Communist 
Party of Spain (PCE), were locked in a struggle to lead the left. The communists underestimated 
the dictatorship’s resilience and expected Franco’s regime to collapse following his death.40 That 
this was not on the cards became clear in July 1976, when Suárez became prime minister. Suárez 
was a regime insider, but also a charismatic reformist who skilfully stole the initiative from the 
opposition. By the end of the year, a divided and outmanoeuvred left had changed course, shifting 
its goals from radical rupture with the regime to gradual and pacted reform.
The regime’s fears were therefore allayed by hope. Indeed, its elites assumed that economic crisis 
and democratisation would not lead to the victory of the radical left riding on a wave of socioeconomic 
frustration,41 and that centrist parties would control the Spanish political system. These expectations 
were based at first on polls showing that the Spanish population was ideologically moderate and 
committed to democratisation, and that Spanish eurocommunism was not as electorally attractive 
as it was assumed to be.42 The 1977 elections convinced the insiders that radical parties could not 
muster much support and that the political formations formed by regime insiders were still popular. 
Based on these perceptions, after a year of hesitation, the regime insiders undertook radical al-
terations of the political system. In the autumn of 1976, the Francoist “parliament” voted to phase 
itself out by passing a package of political reforms that legalised political parties and trade unions 
and scheduled the country’s first democratic elections for the following year. As predicted, Suárez’s 
UCD – a loose coalition of social and Christian democrats, Francoist nostalgics and liberals grouped 
around the figure of the prime minister – won and began liquidating the institutions of authoritar-
ianism. After the UCD won the 1977 elections, an intraparty agreement called the Moncloa pacts 
was brokered by Suárez, committing all political parties to the creation of a new political regime 
and the liberalisation of the Francoist economic system.43 Such an agreement between the dem-
ocratically legitimised regime insiders and the emerging opposition was not achieved in Romania 
after the 1990 elections, where political confrontation remained the norm.
Debt crisis, austerity and the end of Ceausism in Romania
The high degree of power centralisation in Nicolae Ceausescu’s family and its “retinue” made some 
political scientists label his regime as “dynastic socialism”44 or “sultanism”.45 Basically, opposition 
to Ceausescu from within the party–state apparatus could only be clandestine and conspiratorial. 
This made dissidence ideologically stunted. When formerly high-ranking members of the regime 
protested in 1988 by having a letter read out on Radio Free Europe (the so-called “Letter of the Six”), 
they blamed the socioeconomic morass on Ceausescu and his “clique” and called for minimal re-
forms rather than for reform socialism or perestroika.46 
What brought down the edifice of Romania’s authoritarian regime was the combination of a debt 
crisis, the ensuing austerity and changes in Moscow’s politics. While this country’s national-Sta-
linist developmental state had been consistent with increasing trading, technological and financial 
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integration with the capitalist core, its blind spot was growing vulnerability to oil price and financial 
shocks. Consequently, when the 1979 oil shock struck just as access to international credit was 
restricted, the regime drove the country into a debt crisis. 
As Cornel Ban argues regarding the political economy of Romania’s transition, the politics of the 
debt crisis should be the focus of the debate, albeit on different terms than those advanced by Ste-
phen Kotkin and Jan Gross.47 For in contrast to other socialist countries that fell prey to the low 
interest petrodollar loans made available by the 1973 oil crisis, the Romanian debt crisis was the 
result of overinvestment in oil-guzzling industries and oil-refining capacity. While Hungary and Po-
land exponentially increased their convertible currency debt between 1973 and 1979, in Romania it 
was not until 1978 – around the time when interest rates skyrocketed as a result of a change in US 
monetary policy – that the regime took up a heavy foreign debt burden. It did so to pay for the hard 
currency bill that accompanied an industry built without careful regard for the price of imported in-
puts. Faced with the perspective of a sovereign default in 1982, Romania decided to avoid both de-
fault and debt restructuring and opted for a harsh austerity policy regime coupled with an original 
brew of import substitution and export orientation.
The regime’s ideological commitment to centrally planned industrialisation and exclusive policy 
sovereignty was not seen as negotiable, a feature reinforced by the sultanistic nature of its political 
institutions. As long as the regime was committed to this ideological postulate, it was simply incon-
ceivable that it would acquiesce to the choice made by Poland to avoid dramatic austerity measures 
in exchange for the intervention of the IMF in its economic affairs. The regime’s abandonment of a 
legitimising strategy, however minimalistic – that is, guaranteeing basic socioeconomic needs – 
was decisive for its collapse in the favourable external environment provided by 1989. 
In prioritising sovereignty and industrialisation over material welfare, the regime breached its 
implicit social contract with industrial workers – the class it had “created” and claimed to repre-
sent. This left coercion and national ideology as the only means to keep the masses in check. But 
since the latter had been undermined by the 1987 Brașov protests, the regime’s survival hinged 
on the smooth functioning of its repressive apparatus. Confronted with mass protests in Decem-
ber 1989, the Ceausescu regime had no choice but to abandon its commanding posts. After a 
decade of economic repression, the dictatorship imploded: the RCP was banned, Ceausescu was 
swiftly executed, and his immediate collaborators found themselves serving prison terms after 
a televised trial. 
Soon after the events, the new conventional wisdom that emerged was that, far from a revolution, 
this was in fact a well-organised coup d’état, with the mass movement acting as an innocent polit-
ical side-show. In a joint study, two experts on Romania suggested that this interpretation became 
paradoxically widespread in Romanian political discourse after 1990 in general.48 Many transitolo-
gists working with secondary sources or whose field interviews were plagued by gatekeeper prob-
lems fell victim to this view as well.49 But as the most in-depth study of those events concludes, 
the mass mobilisation, widespread violence, spontaneous creation of local revolutionary coun-
cils, breakdown of the revolutionary coalition and the subsequent fierce struggle between the 








revolutionary contenders on the streets of Romania’s cities all would seem to belong to the rep-
ertoire of revolution rather than coup d’état. Moreover, even if Ceaușescu had fallen in a coup, 
this need not have prevented the events in Romania bearing the name revolution.50 
As the same author suggests, the problem is rooted in the export of a local terminological idio-
syncrasy: 
The politically inspired reductionism which resulted in the rejection of the Leninist model of 
revolution in favour of an idealised reading of the liberal variant imposed an impossibly narrow 
definition of revolution onto the political debate in Romania. Not only did the revolution have 
to be an entirely spontaneous mass uprising untainted by previous plotting or the meddling of 
foreign powers, but also the new leadership had to derive from the crowd and be totally uncon-
nected with the previous ruling group.51
Like in Spain, the period stretching from the death of the dictator and the founding elections of May 
1990 was marked by intense politics at both the elite and mass level. After the overthrow of Ceaus-
escu, popular mobilisation prevented former prime ministers from forming provisional govern-
ments, and a group of officials within the RCP who had been marginalised by Ceausescu and a few 
protest leaders with or without dissident pasts formed the FSN, an organisation that proclaimed 
itself on television as the new authority in the land. 
The leader of the group was Ion Iliescu, one of the high-ranking reformist RCP officials demoted by 
Ceausescu during the 1970s and a man who had been expected by Western and some Romanian 
elite circles to become a Romanian Gorbachev. The FSN council announced the end of the leading 
role of the sole party, a “democratic and pluralist system of government”, free elections, separation 
of powers, the “deideologisation” of education, human rights, and other liberal reforms. 
In sum, unlike the negotiated transitions in Spain, the Romanian authoritarian regime died in a 
violent fight following the convergence of an unsuccessfully repressed revolutionary movement 
and a regime breakdown.52 Contrary to sceptics’ assumptions, it quickly became clear that the high 
levels of police repression, constant surveillance and the absence of a robust network of antigov-
ernment activists did not prove to be insurmountable obstacles to one of Europe’s largest popular 
revolutionary movements.
The new power structures approximated a Thermidorian reaction, with elements of the ancien 
regime co-existing alongside transformational social forces. Thus, six of the nine founders of the 
FSN belonged to the nomenklatura, with one of them (general Ștefan Gușe) being involved in the 
repression of the protests in Timisoara.53 The real power inside the system rested in the council’s 
executive bureau, which was headed by Iliescu, who was also appointed as head of state. Likewise, 
the regional and municipal FSN administrators basically recycled the “second echelon” of the RCP. 
At the same time, the FSN formed a provisional government headed by Petre Roman, a 43-year-
old French-educated engineering professor who was the son of another dissident RCP figure but 
was among those who stormed the RCP headquarters. The reformist technocratic elite of Ceaus-
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escu’s vast industrialisation complex was also better represented in the executive than aging pe-
restroika figures.54 Finally, eight dissident intellectuals were also part of the FSN’s national coun-
cil, yet they were completely outvoted by the other 128 members, and most left the FSN once the 
council decided to turn it into a political party on 23 January 1990.
This power structure was soon challenged from below by grassroots labour mobilisation. Soon 
after their formation in many medium and large state enterprises during or in the immediate af-
termath of the revolution, workers councils occupied factories and began to act as the soviets 
promised in the propaganda, calling for the removal of old management and for workers’ control 
of the board. By late January, however, the central FSN headquarters managed to control work-
ers’ councils through a series of legislative acts that basically converted them into unions and “NSF 
councils”, respectively, before they began to fade away quickly from the scene.
The role of the Romanian workers’ councils as a form of democratised corporate governance re-
mains understudied and their disappearance is one of the most intriguing processes of the rev-
olution, especially as some of the councils proved useful for the January counterdemonstrations 
against the opposition. One interesting hypothesis is that their increasing autonomy and radical 
ideas about economic democratisation and participatory democracy were not consistent with the 
FSN’s bureaucratic and technocratic way of doing things. Peter Siani-Davies also suspected that 
“the continued existence of the NSF councils was incompatible with Western norms and their 
eclipse was probably sped by pressure from both the opposition and the outside world.”55
After the precommunist (or “historical”) political parties (Agrarians, Liberals, Social Democrats) 
with roots in the precommunist political life re-emerged – often led by people who were political-
ly active in 1949 – the FSN announced its intention to form a political party on 23 January 1990. Its 
claims to revolutionary legitimacy, combined with its control over the sole TV station, high circula-
tion newspapers and extensive parts of regional and industrial power structures, gave the FSN a 
crushing electoral advantage in the founding elections of May 1990. 
Pending the organisation of the elections, the FSN conservatives abandoned their initial opposition 
to a multiparty system and acquiesced in the establishment of a provisional parliament in which 
the front and other political parties had an equal number of representatives. Yet the fragmentation 
of the opposition (36 parties) gave the front a dominant position inside the provisional parliament. 
Faced with this situation, the historical parties and their supporters in civil society radicalised their 
contestation of the FSN through the occupation of Bucharest’s main square for weeks on end in 
what was Eastern Europe’s longest street demonstration for liberal democracy. 
Democratic consolidation with social compensation in Spain
When combined with more policy space and a higher degree of labour mobilisation, the Spanish 
transition was more likely to go smoother because side packages could be offered to those who 
represented economic frustrations. 








In contrast to Romania, the Spanish labour movement was positioned to extract leverage and pro-
ject a political voice. Unlike in 1959, when labour repression and a buoyant Western European la-
bour market forced excess labour to leave the country, neither of these two conditions applied by 
1976. Jobs were being destroyed throughout Europe at a record pace, forcing governments to re-
strict migration flows. And, back in Spain, a labour union movement liberated from the worst ex-
cesses of the Francoist regime and supported by an emerging political opposition, mobilised and 
demanded state protection against the vagaries of the market. The fact that the General Union of 
Workers (UGT) and the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) were respectively linked to the socialist and 
communist parties enabled them to translate their agenda into specific political platforms using 
existing institutional arrangements. In Romania, the mosaic of free labour union confederations 
that emerged quickly after the revolution was keen to stay away from explicit connections to po-
litical parties, a choice that ultimately weakened their leverage.
Franco’s death also unleashed a wave of strikes throughout Spain. Labour unions had a strong 
dossier in this regard. During the 1960s, Spanish workers, and especially the CCOO, defied repres-
sion and organised strikes at a rate that fell within the Western European spectrum of the time.56 
José María Maravall’s classic study of the Spanish transition found that, by the early 1970s, this 
pressure developed in a crucial direction by weakening the authoritarian regime’s desperate move 
to open the door to limited liberalisation and evolve into a dictablanda:
popular pressure “from below” … especially that coming from the workers’ movement … was a 
causal factor in the Francoist crisis, in the non-viability of any mere “liberalisation” policy, in the 
willingness on the part of the “democratic right” to negotiate the transition and carry through 
reform up to the point of breaking with Francoism, and in the initiative displayed by the left up 
to the 1977 elections.57 
With an eye on the situation in Portugal, Suárez knew that labour could ruin the chances of a com-
prehensive political pact, so he cultivated labour assiduously, while shunning capital. His memoirs 
show that organised business learned about the outcome of the Moncloa negotiations only hours 
before they were released to parliament. Consequently, business declared the Moncloa pacts as 
“unreal and unjust”, as “evidence that the government was executing a socialist programme”, and 
pulled its political support from UCD.
While the repression of labour mobilisation under Francoism had prevented coordinated action, 
coordinated industrial conflict would occur virtually unimpeded after 1975. Although the Spanish 
workers’ protest repertoire did not include Portuguese-style occupations of agricultural and indus-
trial property, they outdid their Portuguese counterparts in terms of strike mobilisation. Studies of 
labour activism recorded an “explosion” in industrial conflict between 1976 and 1979,58 with over 
3.6 million strikers registered in 1976 (up from 1 million in 1975).59 The number of working hours 
lost through strikes quadrupled from 1975 to 1976. But as Fishman’s classic study of plant-level 
Spanish labour suggests, workers were not ready to go beyond strikes and generally supported 
elite pacts as the main avenue of democratisation. Both the CCOO and UGT had good reasons not to 
fear that their interests would be left unrepresented in the party elite negotiations of the late 1970s, 
as the links between these unions and their parties were especially strong during that period.60
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After almost half a century, Karl Polanyi’s pendulum seemed to swing back to (re)embedding the 
market through more redistribution and “voice”. For a while, it seemed that labour would be able to 
force open the historical window to “embedded liberalism”.61 As Portugal witnessed mass expro-
priations and a collapse of the ancien regime, the post-Francoist ruling elites had every reason to 
be cautious. The result of their fear of social unrest was the adoption of expansionary macroeco-
nomic policies in 1976, largely in the form of credit issued by public banks and targeted at high-em-
ployment housing and capital goods sectors. This new policy stance earned elites enough social 
peace to weather the challenges of the political transition and led to an extra percentage of growth 
in GDP, yet played havoc with the conservative inflation-targeting ambitions of the central bank. 
Once it became clear that democratisation was “the only game in town” and the post-Francoists 
won the founding elections of 1977, the liberal reforms launched in the early 1970s were resumed, 
this time by a government staffed by the most liberal elements of the Franco regime. The new 
“superminister” for the economy, Enrique Fuentes Quintana, understood that since the government 
could no longer resort to violence to quell demands for wage indexation, the only available solu-
tion was a negotiated stabilisation package. The resulting policy package contained in the Mon-
cloa pacts mixed liberal measures, such as trade liberalisation, financial liberalisation, an orthodox 
stabilisation plan (currency devaluation, tight monetary policy, wage increases well below inflation 
rates), with more redistributionist measures, such as tax increases and increased welfare expendi-
tures. Indeed, the government made taxation more progressive and raised state revenues by six 
percentage points to pay for the expansion of the safety net. This mix was less orthodox than the 
liberal post-Francoists had wanted, but, as Suárez stressed:
in other times the economic measures agreed upon by the cabinet would have been enough to 
drastically change the course of the economy. But now they have not been as efficient as one 
might have expected and this owes to the impact of politics on our economy. So long as a coun-
try is haunted by unknown quantities of politics, the economy cannot be reactivated or stabilised.62
Labour pressures also led to a dramatic modernisation of the Spanish welfare state. Social spending 
as percentage of GDP grew by 50 percent between 1975 and 1982.63 While spending on public goods 
and economic services in Spain remained stable or even fell as a proportion of GDP after the mid-
1970s, both expenditure groups showed a marked increase between 1975 and 1982, with spending 
on general public services growing the fastest. Within this category, welfare spending and subsidies 
to high-employment private and public companies grew the most. Real compensation for unemploy-
ment benefits grew. To pay for some of the growth of these expenses, the government “European-
ised” the tax system by making it more progressive. It also increased the tax burden by one percent-
age point of GDP per annum between 1977 and 1982, with most of the growth being concentrated on 
high income earners. The new tax legislation imposed extraordinary surcharges on company profits, 
luxury goods and very high personal incomes, introduced an “extraordinary net wealth tax”, abolished 
confidentiality in bank operations, and criminalised tax evasion. As a result of these measures, the 
GDP share on taxes and income rose by 7.6 percent in 1978, almost double the 1975 figure.64 
Finally, if collective bargaining took place de facto at the factory level during the Franco years, 
national level bargains became the rule during the late 1970s. The UCD governments also con-








strained the hire-and-fire freedom of employers by passing a new labour code. For the first time 
since the civil war, it seemed that a Spanish government reacted to social unrest by incorporating 
labour into economic decision-making. Yet unlike in the Republican period of the 1930s, labour en-
tered the policy process through a combination of contentious registers (strikes, direct action) and 
an emerging democratic corporatist institutional infrastructure, rather than outright confrontation. 
Democratic consolidation without social compensation in Romania
Like its Spanish counterpart, Romania’s first transition government was as serious about the vir-
tues of social compensation as an appropriate supportive policy for locking in the country’s demo-
cratic path. The difference with Spain is that this strategy was harder to pursue given the domestic 
and international conditions of the postcommunist transition. 
Indeed, the announced policy priorities of the FSN council suggested a few vaguely formulated 
measures that could be associated with Gorbachevite reform socialism: the restructuring of the 
economy in accordance with the criteria of profitability and efficiency, the end of “administrative-bu-
reaucratic methods of centralised economic management” and the fostering of “free initiative and 
competence” in the management of all economic sectors. The relative stabilisation of political life 
that followed the violent days of December 1989 changed little in this overall dynamic.
Rather than proceed with Polish-style “shock therapy” or even with the more “gradualist” Hungar-
ian or Czechoslovak reforms, the provisional government adopted instead a limited liberalisation 
programme: the dismantlement of central planning, partial land restitution, the selective liberali-
sation of trade, and the legalisation of private enterprises. Other measures suggested mere con-
cern with winning the founding elections. Thus, despite near-zero unemployment and falling pro-
ductivity, the workweek was reduced to five days, wages were increased across the board and the 
state’s meagre hard currency reserves were spent on long-denied imports of consumer goods. 
During the first few months of 1990, the front did not assert a clear ideological stance on the 
economy. In January 1990 Silviu Brucan, the FSN’s éminence grise, labelled the front “a politi-
cal organisation without a defined ideology” but then added that “the only ideological label that 
can be considered for the front is that it situates itself on the left, in the very wide sense given 
to this word”.65 
Brucan was right. The basic elements of a local translation of reform socialism can be detected in 
the public statements made by Iliescu and the provisional government’s economic ministers. For 
example, Iliescu’s New Year’s speech and the first public statement of the ministers of the econo-
my and industry did not mention market reforms and were limited to the main pillars of the pere-
stroika laws adopted by the USSR in 1987 and 1988: decentralisation of economic decision-making, 
restructuring as an alternative to liquidation, the end of “megalomaniac investments”, and the elim-
ination of price controls in farmers’ markets.66 Private ownership in the services, small manufac-
turing and foreign trade sectors also became acceptable. 
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The search for “a third way between plan and market” and a vocal critique of Polish “shock therapy” 
characterised the press interviews given by economic ministers.67 Iliescu’s initially radical resist-
ance to market reforms was also strongly suggested by the fact that, while the RCP was banned 
on 11 January 1990,68 it was claimed that in December 1989 his first option for prime minister was 
Ilie Verdeţ, one of Ceausescu’s premiers during the 1970s. It was only following pressures from 
Brucan that Iliescu ended up appointing Petre Roman, a young academic invested with much sym-
bolic capital from entering the party headquarters and proclaiming the end of dictatorship from the 
balcony. Basically it was only in the spring of 1990 that Iliescu and provisional government min-
isters began to refer more frequently to the transition from the command economy to the “social 
market economy”.
The first Romanian postcommunist government (1990–1992) was only partly committed to adopt-
ing the main policy recommendations of the Washington Consensus. As its reforms led the country 
into a recession whose deleterious effects were unique in peacetime, a heterodox backlash under 
the second freely elected postcommunist government (1992–1996) sought a third way between 
neoliberal orthodoxy and reform socialism. 
But this policy of social compensation was heavily constrained by international policy coercion. In 
effect, the IMF and World Bank had a great say in the Romanian policy process since until 1994 Ro-
mania had no access to capital markets due to the reputation costs incurred by the former dictator’s 
conflict with sovereign bond investors.69 Using a monetarist theory of prices, IMF experts dealing with 
Romania linked prices to the broad money supply and inflation to excess demand. Therefore the fund 
asked the government to liberalise industrial prices and to cheapen imports by devaluing the curren-
cy.70 This rendered firms unable to pay their suppliers, sending the level of intercompany arrears to 
40 percent of their turnover. Credit contracted dramatically, leading to chain bankruptcies, while wage 
purchasing power collapsed after prices were liberalised in an economy marred by a high degree of 
monopoly and oligopoly. Over the next few years, almost one in every two jobs disappeared for good. 
When governments tried to stop the meltdown, though the monetisation of intercompany arrears or 
the slowdown of privatisation, the IMF would suspend the stand-by agreement.71 
Similarly, the World Bank’s loan programme from June 1991 provided financing for a list of criti-
cal imports in exchange for the Romanian government’s agreement to use Western experts in the 
privatisation programme, a modest constraint on the government’s independence. But these loan 
conditions multiplied suddenly in June 1992. In exchange for $400 million, the cabinet committed 
to a laundry list of macroeconomic and structural reforms, leading to the removal of some of the 
cabinet’s neodevelopmentalist reforms such as mark-up caps, export restrictions and the large 
share of unprivatisable regies autonomes (state-owned firms in areas deemed essential such as 
utilities, transportation, etc.) in the public sector.72
The IMF’s decision to suspend its fourth standby agreement four months before the 1996 gener-
al elections helped the domestic dynamics that pulled the plug on this grafting exercise. Since the 
political opposition was generally aligned with neoliberal transition economics, this looked like a 
controversial investment of the fund in domestic politics.73 In a country where Westernisation was 
a popular electoral platform in urban areas, the opposition’s chances of winning increased dra-








matically after it became clear that Romania’s application to join the EU stood no chance due to 
the lack of the IMF’s imprimatur. 
After the ex-communists lost the 1996 elections, a centre-right coalition announced that the econom-
ic growth achieved by the left-leaning Vacaroiu government (1992–1996) was unsustainable and initi-
ated a “shock therapy” neoliberal reform in which both domestic and external audiences invested ex-
aggerated expectations. Ironically, the official consolidation of democracy came in the same package, 
terminating most attempts at social compensation as a political strategy. The socioeconomic results 
of this reform, worsened by the East Asian crisis and the Kosovo wars, were much worse than the 
reformists expected and consequently the coalition was swept out of office in the 2000 elections. Back 
in office and pressed by EU integration, the ex-communists embarked on the most systematic and 
successful economic reforms seen since 1990. In four years, they adopted most of the standard mar-
ket institutions of the Western European “third way” and even outdid their Western peers by adopting 
highly regressive right-libertarian tax reforms that both the EU and the IMF criticised. 
Conclusion
Revisiting the comparison of Spain and Romania’s transitions to democracy calls for a reas-
sessment of Linz and Stepan’s framework. In spite of significant differences in the structure and 
breakdown – or, in the Spanish case, dismantlement – of their respective authoritarian systems, 
Spain and Romania experienced transitions to democracy guided by remnants of the old regime. 
In both cases, regime insiders directed the democratisation process in its initial and ultimately 
most meaningful stages. This dynamic produced critical repercussions, lasting beyond the stage 
of democratic consolidation. While exploring the long-term effects on the political economy of the 
Spanish and Romanian transitions remains beyond the scope of this article, current events sug-
gest that democratisation processes produce long-term effects that the literature on democratic 
transition, with its focus on short-term dynamics and its end-goal in democratic consolidation, has 
failed to take into account. 
Spain and Romania’s transitions also exemplify the importance of economic developments both 
before and during transitions to democracy. The overlooked contribution of the 1970s oil shocks 
and the subsequent debt crisis to the termination of authoritarian rule calls for an increased fo-
cus on the role of economic shocks and crises as catalysts of sweeping political change. More-
over, access to sovereign bond markets and the absence exposure to international policy condi-
tionality meant that Spanish governments could use social compensation as a strategy of political 
democratisation in times of economic stress, while their Romanian counterparts were much more 
constrained in this regard. The importance of these international political economy factors also 
suggests that, in spite of Linz and Stepan’s stress on the importance of individual agency during 
transitions to democracy, world-systemic dynamics often play a critical role in these processes. 
Scholars of democratic transitions can take note of these findings and apply them in further re-
search. While our analysis stretches from the period preceding the demise of authoritarianism to 
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that of democratic consolidation, comparative research on the subsequent development of the 
Spanish and Romanian political economies can yield relevant findings. The prospect of European 
integration also played a critical role in both transitions to democracy, on both a political and eco-
nomic level. The crisis within European institutions induced by the 2008 financial crisis has now 
challenged aspects of the alleged achievements of both transitions, and therefore offers extensive 
ground for research for prospective researchers. Last but not least, comparative studies between 
other transitions that occupy different places in the Linz and Stepan canon can be useful in chal-
lenging an overly taxonomic – or even taxidermic – approach to the question of democratisation.
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